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An interpolation introduced by K. Schuhmann in his critical edition of De corpore (chap. VI, § 13) diametrically overturns the 
meaning of Hobbes’s doctrine of distinction of accidents in comparison with all previous editions. The article focuses on the complexity of 
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What I intend to do is to develop some reflections on Hobbes’s doctrine of 
distinction of accidents, a key doctrine to understand Hobbes’s doctrine of science. 
Let me start from a text of chapter six, paragraph thirteen, which contains a 
fundamental distinction whose sense is diametrically overturned by the 1997 critical 
edition in comparison with the previous editions. I shall quote the text first 
according to Schuhmann’s critical edition of 1999 and then according to editio 
princeps of 1655: 
 
Principia  autem illa solae Definitiones sunt, 
quarum duo sunt genera. Alia enim sunt eorum 
vocabulorum, quae res significant, quarum causa 
aliqua intelligi <non> potest; alia eorum, quae 
res significant, quarum causa intelligi potest. 
Prioris generis sunt corpus sive materia, quantitas 
sive extensio, motus simpliciter, denique quae omni 
materiae insunt. Secundi generis sunt corpus tale, 
motus talis et tantus, magnitudo tanta, talis figura, 
aliaque omnia, quibus unum corpus ab alio 
distingui potest1.  
Principia autem illa, solæ Definitiones sut, quarum 
duo sunt genera, alia enim sunt eorum 
vocabolorum, quae res significant quarum causa 
aliqua intelligi potest;  alia eorum quæ res 
significant quarum causa intelligi non potest. 
Prioris generis sunt corpus sive materia, quantitas 
sive extensio, motus simpliciter, denique quæ omni 
materiæ insunt. Secundi generis sunt corpus tale, 
motus talis & tantus, magnitudo tanta, talis figura, 
aliaque omnia quibus unum corpus ab alio distingui 
potest2.  
                                                 
1. Thomas Hobbes, De corpore. Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Prima, Édition critique, notes, appendices et 
index par Karl Schuhmann, Introduction par Karl Schuhmann avec la collaboration de Martine 
Pécharman, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1999 (hereafter referred to as Dc 1999), VI.13, p. 67 
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The text of the critical edition differs from all previous editions (except for 1997 
German translation by Schuhmann himself): it differs not only from the 1655 editio 
princeps but also from the 1656 English translation, anonymous but published and 
revised by Hobbes himself. It differs from the next seventeenth and eighteenth 
century editions and from both the Molesworth editions and the 1972 Italian 
translation. It differs from all those previous editions because of the 
interpolation/displacement of the negation non  which, obviously, reverses the 
meaning of the sentence
3.  
Thus, at this fundamental juncture in Hobbes’s argument we have two contra-
sting versions of the doctrine of  the distinctions of accidents.  
The fact that Schuhmann needs to make such interpolations clearly shows, if 
only, how puzzling is this crucial point, essential to understanding the doctrine of 
distinctions of accidents.  
The first question is, of course, why does Schuhmann make the interpolations? 
i.e.: why does he add the first negation and expunge the second one? The second 
question is: are his motivations justified, admissible or convincing?  
To answer the first question is rather easy and it demands only to explain the 
contradiction Schuhmann admittedly intends to eliminate reversing the 
relationships between the sets of accidents that have / have not some conceivable cause 
and the sets of accidents which are common to all Matter / we can distinguish bodies by.  
According to all pre-Schuhmann editions, to the former kind of accidents (i.e. 
what «have some conceivable Cause») belong «whatsoever is common to all 
Matter», i.e. the accidents common to all bodies; to the latter (i.e. the accidents 
«which we can conceive no Cause at all») belong the accidents «we can distinguish 
one Body from another by». According to Schuhmann the relationships must be 
inverted. 
The context is known. The thirteenth paragraph distinctions come after Hobbes 
has affirmed, in the previous paragraph, that «the whole Method… of 
Demonstration is Syntheticall, consisting of that order of Speech, which begins from 
Primary or most Universall Propositions, which are manifest of themselves»
4. 
These primary propositions, or «principles» are definitions, and definitions are in 
                                                                                                                                                          
2. Elementorum philosophiae sectio prima De corpore. Authore Thoma Hobbes Malmesburiensi, Londini: Andreae 
Crook, 1655 (hereafter referred to as Dc 1655), VI.13, p. 50 (bold mine). 
3. The sentence, in the version of all mentioned editions, is as follows (I quote only the version of 1656 
ed. for the sake of brevity): «Now, such Principles are nothing but Definitions; whereof there are two 
sorts; one, of Names, that signifie such things as have some conceivable Cause, and another of such 
Names as signifie things of which we can conceive no Cause at all. Names of the former kind are, Body or 
Matter, Quantity or Extension, Motion, and whatsoever is common to all Matter. Of the second kind are, 
such a Body, such and so great Motion, so great Magnitude, such Figure, and whatsoever we can 
distinguish one Body from another by» (Elements of philosophy the first section, concerning body written in Latin by 
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury; and now translated into English; to which are added Six lessons to the professors of 
mathematicks of the Institution of Sr. Henry Savile, in the University of Oxford, London: Printed by R. & W. 
Leybourn for Andrew Crooke, 1656 (hereafter Dc 1656), VI.13, p. 59 (bold mine). Cf., also, The English 
Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, now first collected and edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., 
London: J. Bohn, 1839-1945, I, p. 81.  
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terms of causes, that is in terms of generations produced by simpler accidents (that 
is, again, ultimately in terms of motion of simpler accidents). Hobbes’s definition 
process implies of course ultimate or first accidents (otherwise there would be an 
infinite regress) coinciding with their own causes; and this is the avowed case of 
motion. Therefore it is quite natural to think that Hobbes’s distinction of 
definitions provides, in the chain of definitions, the existence of first, simple and 
universal accidents, not caused or generated (and in this sense whose causes are not 
known). And what follows in the paragraph seems to confirm this interpretation: 
 
And Names of the former kind [which, according to the critical edition, are those whose cause 
we cannot conceive] are well enough defined, when by Speech as short as may be, we raise in the 
Mind of the Hearer perfect and cleer Ideas or Conceptions of the Things named, as when we 
Define Motion to be the leaving of one place, and the acquiring of another continually; for though no Thing 
Moved, nor any Cause of Motion be in that Definition, yet at the hearing of that Speech, there 
will come into the Mind of the Hearer an Idea of Motion cleer enough
5.  
 
In conclusion, since Hobbes admits that there are accidents (first: motion) 
whose definitions cannot be in terms of causes, but are only «Speechs» capable to 
«raise in the Mind of the Hearer perfect and cleer Ideas or Conceptions», it seems 
far more logical to identify them (contrary to all pre-critical editions) with the 
second kind of accidents, above defined as those «of which we can conceive no 
Cause at all» (as Schuhmann does), rather than with the first sort above defined as 
those whose causes we conceive (as all previous editions do).  
From this point of view, Schuhmann’s choice appears to be quite justified and 
defendable. It appears also quite in line with Hobbes’s doctrine that these universal 
accidents are the natural equipment of the constitutive «manners by which» the 
mind conceives any body
6.  
I myself, before methodically reflecting about Hobbes’s doctrine of science, had 
come to the same conclusion; but later I changed my mind, for many important 
reasons, both, so to say, historical and conceptual. The historical one is, of course, 
that all the editions of De corpore published during Hobbes’s life (even though 
neglecting the later editions) agree on the same (so to say) erroneous version, and, in 
particular, the 1656 English translation which, though anonymous, was certainly 
revised by Hobbes himself.  
The conceptual ones are more complex and demand a longer argument.      
The interpretive problem is clearly this: whether the accidents «common to all 
Matter» («quae omni materiae insunt») are those which «have some conceivable 
Cause» («quarum causa aliqua intelligi potest»), or else are those «of which we can 
conceive no Cause at all» («quarum causa aliqua intelligi non potest»), as Schuhman 
reads.   
Admittedly the matter is not one of minor importance. Firstly, we need to begin 
by asking whether there is some ambiguity in the expressions («things» or) 
                                                 
5. Ibid. 
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«accidents» which «have / have not some conceivable Cause». In fact, this 
expression can have another sense than what, given the context, seemed the more 
logic and spontaneous to Schuhmann.  
Actually we cannot overlook that this couple of concepts – accidents whose causes 
are conceivable and accidents whose causes are not conceivable – appears in the first step of 
Hobbes’s argument, that is in the definition of philosophy itself: 
 
Philosophia est effectuum sive phaenomenωn ex 
conceptis eorum causis seu generationibus, et 
rursus generationum quae esse possunt, ex 
cognitis effectibus per rectam ratiocinationem 
acquisita cognitio7. 
PHILOSOPHY  is such knowledge of Effects or 
Appearances, as we acquire by true Ratiocination 
from the knowledge we have first of their Causes 
or Generation: And again, of such Causes or 
Generations as may be from knowing first their 
Effects8. 
 
Now, this definition provides (as the chap. XXV.1 shows) for two cases of 
acquiring philosophy (i.e. science): the first is when we can conceive the causes of 
accidents, the second is when we do not conceive them. In the first one we can 
procede deductively from definitions in terms of conceived causes (conceptis causis: 
that is «known generations») and this is undoubtedly the domain of common 
accidents (that is geometry: or, better philosophia prima and de rationibus motuum and 
magnitudinum). In the second case we also have to proceed deductively, but starting 
from hypothetical definitions, that is definitions in terms of hypothetical 
generations built or imagined according to (as Hobbes says in chap. XXV) «such 
general Propositions as have been already demonstrated»
9. And this is undoubtedly 
the domain of accidents that make us «distinguish one Body from another», which 
is as much to say: the accidents «determined» that belong to «singular things»
10, that 
is, as we have seen, «such and so great Motion, so great Magnitude, such Figure», 
but also such color, such sound, such savor etc. (that is the domain that Hobbes 
also calls that of the «Variety of those things we perceive by Sense»
11. And this is 
certainly the domain of physics.  
What can deceives us is that to this domain belong not only those accidents that 
are the «sensible qualities», «qualitates sensibiles»
12, but also the quantitative ones if 
they are determined («such and so great Motion, so great Magnitude, such Figure»), that it to 
say, when they have the gnoseological function of distinguishing in our perceptive 
activity one Body from another (they are to be understood as those that make up 
the actual perceptive content of the «singular thing»). 
It is true that the accidents determined (by which a body is distinguished from 
another, or belonging to «singular things») can be explained only by hypothetical 
causes, or generations in terms of the common accidents (that, for the sake of 
                                                 
7. Dc 1999, I.2, p. 12. 
8. Dc 1656, I.2, p. 2. 
9. Dc 1656, XXV.1, p. 290. 
10. Dc 1656, VI.4, p. 50. 
11. Dc 1656, VI.5, p. 51. 
12. Dc 1656, VI.6, p. 53; Dc 1999, VI.6, p. 61 and XXV.3, p. 270. Hobbes’s distinction of accidents                               5 
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simplicity, we can call quantitative) which being «universals» in the end cannot be 
defined but in terms of causes which «are manifest of themselves»
13, but this is not 
to say that they (the common ones and universal) could be identified with accidents 
whose causes are inconceivable (as Schuhmann does).  
Schuhmann’s construal, although it arises from a real ambiguity, may induce us 
to miss that the distinction, between accidents whose cause is conceivable and accidents 
whose cause is not so, concerns the fundamental cognitive status of accidents, which is 
the rationale of the whole Hobbes’s doctrine of science. A distinction so 
fundamental for the role it plays in the structure of De corpore a s  t o  b e  q u i t e  
appropriately comparable to the distinction between analytical and synthetic 
judgments in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  
Like Kant’s distinction, Hobbes’s one actually conditions the deploying of all the 
argument of De corpore since it defines two distinct domains of science (in the 
proper sense of science, that is as «cognitio του
~   διóτι»
14. The former can be 
correctly said a priori, because all accidents belong to it whose kinetic generations 
(to be used in definitions) the mind has the power to imagine (or conceive). In 
other words, this is the domain of the accidents whose kinetic constructions 
(imagined by the mind) coincide with their concepts (like a circle or a geometrical 
figure). The latter domain is made up of those accidents whose causes cannot be 
but hypothetical, because their imaginable generations (whatever they may be) no 
way coincide with their real concept or image (i.e. with the real perceptive content, 
like a color, or sound and so on)
15. And the construction of all these hypotheses 
demands a preliminary hypothesis on the kinetic nature of the φαι´νεσθαι or 
«Apparition it self»
16. This domain is of course that of physics.  
Thus Hobbes’s distinction of accidents (which, as I have already observed, is 
implied in the first definition of philosophy) is intrinsically connected with the 
epistemological distinctions between geometry and physics. But there is more; it is 
even the same connected with the basic distinction, we come upon at the beginning 
of  Philosophia prima after the annihilation hypothesis, between two preliminary 
«considerations» the mind can have of the things appearing to it, that is of its 
phantasmata (of course, before constructing science).  
Consideration (to consider) is a fundamental word in Hobbes’s vocabulary: «considera-
re, Graece λογίζεσθαι, sicut ipsum computare sive ratiocinari συλλογίζεσθαι nomi-
nant»
17. To consider is the same as reasoning (or beginning to reasoning): be bring 
into account or in rationes venire.  
The act of considering has intrinsically to do with the nominalistic (or if I may 
say so, hyper-nominalistic) way Hobbes intends the dependence (both conceptual and 
                                                 
13. Dc 1656, VI.5, p. 51. 
14. Dc 1999, VI.2, p. 58. 
15. Dc 1999, XII.3. In other words, while, by example, the conception of a circle coincides with the 
generation by the movement of rotation of a body, the conception of a color will never result from the 
description, or imagination of a movement (in order that this happens, we have to enter intentionally a 
hypothetical merely mechanistic world, where the perception itself is reduced to a kinetic event). 
16. Dc 1656, XXV.1, p. 290. 
17. Dc 1999, I.3, p. 13. 6   Agostino Lupoli  
 
 
 
 
ontological) of accidents on the substance, that is on the body. The dependence is 
of course universally admitted by the early modern philosophers, but differently 
conceived. Now, in Hobbes’s perspective (rather complex and often 
misunderstood), we have no ideas of accidents (ideas in the proper sense) – as it 
happens in the Cartesian, or Lockean, or Spinoza’s approach. Hobbes thinks that 
the real or tota  idea is always the actual perception /sensation / imagination 
/conception of one body. On the one hand, the body is not actually perceived / 
sensed / imagined /conceived but qua figured, white, hard, great, located etc.; 
namely it is conceived in many manners (this is the English word used in 1656 
translation for modi) or with (to use the usual expression) many accidents. On the 
other hand, of these manners of conceiving the body, there are no real ideas but as 
ideas of the bodies which are endowed with them.  
In other words, there is no real idea of white, of three, or of extended, but as ideas 
of a white body, of a threesome of bodies, or of corpus simpliciter. The cognitive operation 
that results in accidents is not an analytic act of logical nature, nor an analytic act of 
psychological nature (according to the Locke-Berkeley’s line of thought), but it is 
precisely to consider. And to consider is already reasoning or calculating, because, put 
very briefly, it consists in not taking into account (then in subtracting) all or certain 
accidents (that is manners of conceiving the body) except that we are concerned in.  
On the one hand, it is a basic cognitive operation, because common to all men; 
on the other hand, Hobbes sees in it the mind leaving an unproblematic terrain and 
entering in a problematic dimension characterized by the emerging of questions 
concerning the «cause of names» – or (which is the same) the «cause of concepts» – 
by the introduction of abstract names
18, and by the explicit construction of 
propositions (without which the abstract names cannot exist)
19. 
We know that phantasms (or ideas) cannot be immediately identified with 
«accidents», if only because they are numbered as a distinct «kind» («genus») among 
the «four kinds» of «all things to which we give names, namely, Bodies, Accidents, 
Phantasms, and Names themselves»
20.  
Phantasms – namely, apparitions, phaenomena, ideas – are defined as «eae quae 
sentientibus nobis innasci perpetuo experimur»
21, namely things «which are perpe-
tually generated within us whilest we make use of our Senses» or of our 
                                                 
18. Dc 1999, III.3. 
19. Dc 1999, III.4. 
20. Dc 1656, V.2, p. 43. 
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imagination
22. Another aspect of theirs is that: «our Phantasmes or Ideas are not al-
wayes the same; but that new ones appear to us, and old vanish»
23.  
Put briefly, sharing (in a sense) the modern skeptics’s approach
24 to the 
epistemological (and gnoseological) problem, Hobbes ascribes the status of 
indubitability to the cognitive level of mere contents of conscience (that is, for him, 
of sensation and imagination). Though we do not «know why they are and from 
what Causes they proceed»
25, phantasms (qua what «appears» to conscience) are 
such as it is impossible to question their existence: «That there be such phantasms we 
know well enough by nature» («cognoscimus naturaliter, quod sunt»), and therefore 
they are «the first Beginnings of Knowledge», «Principia scientiae omnium prima»
26. 
Therefore it is from taking them into a general consideration that Philosophia prima 
(The first grounds of philosophy) begins. The starting point of our knoweledge is to have 
phantasms, that is to have ideas.  
From this point of view Hobbes shares also skeptics’s identification of percipere 
with intelligere (understanding); that is as much to say that there is no perceiving (i.e. 
having ideas or phantasms) without understanding what we perceive. Thus 
perceiving is an enigmatic phenomen characterized by the fact that 1) there is no 
knowledge of the object but through its phantasma ( «omnis nostra cognitio rerum 
existentium est imaginatio ea, quae a rerum actione efficitur in sensoria nostra»
27), 2) 
there is no perception of phantasma (or idea) but as a perception of the object which 
it is the image of: phantasm and its object, or idea and thing, or cognitio and res, are 
terms absolutely complementary (except for, as we will see, for the imaginary 
space).  
Therefore to clear definitively the field of any ambiguous and obscure 
involvement of the object as something transcending its phantasm, like the concept 
of substance according the classical and scholastic ontologies, Hobbes introduces, 
at the beginning of the philosophia prima, the hypothesis of annihilatio mundi (as it is 
known, the hypothesis belongs to the scholastic tradition, but in Hobbes its use is 
totally different). 
                                                 
22. Dc 1656, XXV.1, pp. 290-291. Cfr. R. Descartes, Principia Philosophiae I.9: «Cogitationis nomine, intelli-
go illa omnia, quae nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est» (Œuvres de Des-
cartes, publiées par Charles Adam & Paul Tannery, nouvelle présentation, en co-édition avec le Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982-1991 (hereafter AT), 
VIII-1, p. 7). Cfr. anche J. Locke: «The Mind […], reflecting also on what passes within it self […]» (An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Edited with an Introduction by Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975, II, XXI.1, p. 233). 
23. Dc 1656, XXV.1, p. 291. 
24. According to F. Sanchez the function of sense is essential but instrumental: «Unum cognoscens homo 
est. Una cognitio in omnibus his. Eadem enim mens est quae externa, et quae interna cognoscit. Sensus nil 
cognoscit: nil iudicat: solùm excipit quae cognitura menti offerat. Quemadmodum aër non colores, non 
lucem videt: quamvis hos excipiat visui offerendos» (Franciscus Sanchez Philosophus et Medicus Doctor, 
Quod nihil scitur, Lugduni: Ant. Gryphium, 1581, pp. 55-56). 
25. Dc 1656, VI.1, p. 49. 
26. Ibid. (Dc 1999, VI.1, p. 58). 
27. Thomas Hobbes, Critique du ‘De mundo’ de Thomas White, Introduction, texte critique et notes par Jean 
Jacquot et Harold Whitmore Jones, Paris: Vrin-CNRS, 1973 (hereafter De motu), III.2, p. 117. 8   Agostino Lupoli  
 
 
 
 
By the introduction of the hypothesis Hobbes believes he can demonstrate that 
there is no difference between what the «Man still remaining» after the annihilatio 
mundi does in order to acquire knowledge and what we do «though all things be still 
remaining in the world». Regardless of the existence and nature of the transcendent 
world of substances, reasoning (i.e. computing) has only to do with our phantasms.  
The term phantasm seems to be a compromise between the skeptical term of 
spectrum and that of phaenomenon, and serves to stress the subjective nature of 
appearances, the fact that they are not to be confused (like prefilosofical attitude 
does) with things themselves.  
Then what are phantasms? How can we problematize them, given only the 
certainty of their mere mental existence as appearances? We know they are, Hobbes 
says, and there is no perception without understanding the thing perceived. Thus 
the knowledge begins with understanding what we perceive. And this 
understanding can be only of two kinds, because there are only two manners of 
considering our phantasms, or, the things conceived. One is to consider them 
(«that is, bring into account») as «species of external things»; the other is to consider 
them as «internal accidents of our Mind»
28.  
The former consideration shows us that the understanding of the phantasm as 
species of external things (even if «not as really existing, but appearing only to exist, 
or to have a Being without us») demands a reference to something independent 
from the mind, that is bodies. That is to say that, a reference to bodies is necessary 
to consider phantasms as species or images. Therefore the consideration of 
phantasms as mere species or images or ideas belonging to the mind (or to 
sentient) does not allow (pace Descartes) to sever all reference to the body (even 
though Hobbes never defines how to conceive this reference).  
The alternative is precisely when we want to sever every reference of phantasms 
to external things, and consider them as only concerning the mind. This is possible 
only considering them as «internal accidents of our Mind»
29. But also in this case we 
cannot but involve the body, because we cannot imagine nothing existing but as a 
body. Therefore to consider phantasms as «internal accidents of our Mind», is 
precisely to consider them as accidents of a peculiar body which is our brain. But, 
since we have no experience (i.e. idea) at all, nor can we ever have, of our 
phantasms (i.e. we cannot have no ideas of ideas: omnino impossibile est cogitare se 
cogitare, as Hobbes says in response to Descartes
30), such a consideration 
presupposes the assumption of the mechanical hypothesis according to which the 
mind is a material brain (anima corporea) whose accidents are movements. In other 
words, it is impossible to understand anything we think without a reference to body 
(of course not in the sense scholastic, Cartesian or Spinozan ontologies intend the 
reference to the their substances).     
                                                 
28. Dc 1656, VII.1, p. 68. 
29. Ibid. 
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Incidentally it is noteworthy that Hobbes’s distinction represents an important 
revision of scholastic-Cartesian distinction between objective and formal reality of 
ideas (a distinction that had in Descartes’s Medititationes de prima philosophia a very 
important function). While species, i.e. images (of external things) correspond to 
what Descartes called the objective or representative reality of ideas, Hobbes’s distinction 
presents a very different conceptualization of the formal reality of ideas, that is of the 
idea as act of thinking.  
In the Cartesian perspective the absolute certainty of the cogito, that is to say of 
the self being a thinking thing or a thinking substance, converts the indubitability of 
possessing ideas in the certain knowledge that those acts of thinking are performed 
by the mind
31, that is, that their formal reality is that of «modes» of a thinking 
substance:  
 
putandum est … talem esse naturam ipsius ideae ut nullam aliam ex se realitatem formalem exigat 
praeter illam quam mutuatur a cogitatione mea, cujus est modus
32. 
 
In other words, given the ontological significance of the cogito the formal reality 
of an idea has nothing problematic: it is «that which it borrows from our 
consciousness, of which it is but a mode», or in the French translation «seulement 
un mode» de l’esprit
33.  
Hobbes  makes two objections: the former is that it seems to him that 
Descartes’s definition of ideas in terms of «modes of consciousness» is not in terms 
of a subject but in terms of a «faculty», «acts», or «property», while we cannot really 
conceive any act or mode (he says in the Third Objections to Meditations), «sine sub-
jecto suo»
34. The latter is that, even though Descartes’s definition were correctly in 
terms of a «subject», this subject cannot be but a body, since we can conceive 
nothing existing but «sub ratione corporea»
35, that is as a body.  
But, since we have no real experience of our phantasms as accidents of a body 
(that is, as we have seen, we have no idea of ideas: «impossibile est cogitare se cogitare»), 
when we consider our phantasms as «internal accidents of our Mind» we are 
assuming a hypothesis on the corporeal nature of our minds. Therefore the formal 
reality of our thoughts, phantasms, ideas (or whatever other name we want to give 
them) can be only in terms of hypothetical movements of our brain, mechanically 
                                                 
31. «Nam si dicam, ego video, vel ego ambulo, ergo sum; & hoc intelligam de visione, aut ambulatione, 
quae corpore peragitur, conclusio non est absolute certa; quia, ut saepe sit in somnis, possum putare me 
videre, vel ambulare, quamvis oculos non aperiam, & loco non movear, atque etiam forte, quamvis nullum 
habeam corpus; Sed si intelligam de ipso sensu, sive conscientia videndi aut ambulandi, quia tunc refertur 
ad mentem, quae sola sentit, sive cogitat se videre aut ambulare, est plane certa» (R. Descartes, Principia 
Philosophiae I.9, AT VIII-1, p. 7). 
32. R. Descartes, Meditatio III, AT VII, p. 41. 
33. «Mais on doit sçavoir que toute idée estant un ouvrage de l’esprit , sa nature est telle qu’elle ne 
demande de soy aucune autre realité formelle, que celle qu’elle reçoit & emprunte de la pensée ou 
de l’esprit, dont elle seulement un mode, c’est à dire une maniere ou façon de penser» (R. 
Descartes, Meditation troisième, AT IX-1, p. 32). 
34. Thomas Hobbes, Objectiones tertiae, cit., Ob. II, AT VII, p. 173.  
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generated (through the organs of sense) by other hypothetical movements of 
external bodies. When this hypothesis is scientifically formulated, it is the only 
possible and hypothetical premise of physics, which precisely begins from the 
kinetic-mechanical hypothesis of the φαι´νεσθαι. 
According to some scholars Hobbes’s reduction of phantasms to «internal 
accidents of our mind» would give evidence for Hobbes’s phenomenalism, since it 
is interpreted as an integral subjectification of bodies accidents; it is not exactly so, 
because the hypothetical reduction of the mind to a body, that is to the brain, is not 
an essential theoretical constituent of any form of phenomenalism. Rather, it it is 
the consideration of accidents as «species of external things» (even though «not as 
really existing, but appearing onely to exist, or to have a Being without us») that 
generate a science concerning things totally depending on the mind.  
We have seen that considering means «be brought into account», «in rationes 
venire»
36. To consider «species» means to consider things merely as imaginated, that 
is merely qua imagined or «cognita», that is finally by or juxta the common 
accidents; i.e. the accidents whose causes or generations are known, that is are in 
power of the mind.  
The sciences concerning common accidents are the philosophia prima and 
geometry (namely, the third part of De corpore, the science of Proportions of motions and 
magnitudes); and, since the hypothetical science (i.e. the science deriving from the 
consideration of accidents «as internal accidents of the mind») is framed in terms of 
the «general propositions»
37 of the first two sciences, the consideration of accidents 
as «internal accidents of the mind» must be preceded by the other as species of 
external thing; «and this is the manner – Hobbes concludes, at the beginning of phi-
losophia prima – we are now to consider them»
38. (In a sense Hobbes’s distinction 
corresponds exactly to our familiar distinction between mind and brain, between 
perceptive contents and neuronal events of the brain). 
Some scholars wondered whether Hobbes is a phenomenalist. The answer 
depends, of course, on the definition of phenomenalism (if a consistent definition 
is possible without being entangled in the construction of an entire philosophy). In 
any case, if by phenomenalism we mean to critically supersede the ingenuous and 
dogmatic realism, assuredly he is a phenomenalist. But a phenomenalist who could 
be also defined a realist because, to put it very briefly, he claims that the body (i.e. 
something non depending on our imagination) has an unavoidable and essential 
function in making comprehensible what we think or imagine. Thus to admit or 
not the existence of bodies – res existentes – does not depend on us, but it is a 
necessary implication and condition of thinking / understanding what we think / 
understand. From this point of view Hobbes’s materialism has nothing to do with 
an  ontolological  or  metaphysical  materialism and even less with a dogmatic one. A 
confirmation of this is given by the concept of imaginary space.  
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In spite of the above illustrated function of the body as something existing, we 
cannot conceive anything existing (i.e. independent on imagination) but «sub spatio 
imaginario substerni et supponi videtur» (that is: «placed in and subjected to 
Imaginary Space»
39). And that is as much to say that we cannot think anything 
existing which is not subjected to something that does not exist, because depends 
entirely on the imagination. A paradox Hobbes was completely aware of. 
From this point of view it would seem that that of «spatium imaginarium» is the 
only idea whose conception and comprehension not only does not depend on the 
experience, that is on the phantasm of «singular thing» (that is it is not an accident 
of a singular thing, or a «Manner of our conception of Body», as the «real space», 
spatium reale, is), but precedes the experience, is the condition of the phantasm of 
the singular body. Hobbes had already openly admitted it in The Motu: «existentiam 
spatii [imaginarii] dependere non ab existentia corporis sed ab existentia imaginati-
vae facultatis»
40. In terms of the four nameable things (Hobbes’s categories, so to 
say), spatium imaginarium is a phantasm, but a singular, very peculiar phantasm 
because it is the phantasm of no singular thing of experience, but the «phantasma 
corporis simpliciter», that is, as he adds: «dicemus spatium esse imaginem corporis, 
quatenus corporis»
41. Which is as much to say that the imaginary space is the real 
space (and real space is an accident of the body and intrinsically connected to the 
existens) qua cognitum, as it is known.  
It seems to me that a tension here emerges between a hyper-nominalism and a 
form of criticism or transcendentalism; a tension which is resolved in such a way to 
save nominalism. In other words what Hobbes seeks to save is the process of 
consideration, that is of «computing or reasoning», starting from phantasms of 
singular things. To consider the body regardless (that is subtracting) every 
determination connected to the body as existent (that is regardless every its 
accident) does not produce the annihilation of the phantasm or sensation, but leave 
another phantasm (not of course any accident) of the body considered only as 
imagined or imaginable and this is the imaginary space. This is further confirmed 
by the fact that Hobbes defines a determined imaginarium spatium as what the mere 
image is made up of («constat»
42). Of course what is made up of by the imaginativa 
facultas.  
I cannot understand this doctrine but as a somersault in a new philosophical 
terrain which has nothing to do with an Aristotelian or scholastic conceptual 
dimension and that, rather, can be defined as a form of transcendentalism.  
All this recalls to mind the authoritative opinion on Hobbes expressed by Pierre 
Bayle: who, on the one hand, attributed to Hobbes «sans doute une hardiesse, ou 
une intrépidité d’esprit» (a boldness, or intrepidity of mind); and, on the other, 
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considered Hobbes not much concerned in a real dialogue with philosophical 
tradition: «Il avoit beaucoup plus médité que lu; & il ne s’étoit jamais soucié d’une 
grande Bibliothèque»
43; and he adds: «pour un homme qui a tant vécu, sa lecture 
étoit peu de chose»
44. («He had much more meditated than read, and he never cared 
about a great library… for a man who had a so long life, reading was a little thing»).   
Bayle acknowledges Hobbes’s originality and novelty, but does not recognize to 
him a full right of citizenship in the Republic of Letters (Respublica literaria).  
The literati Bayle is thinking of are actually students of humanities; but even more 
strong was the ostracism of the mathematicians and scientists. What it is certain is 
that, whether it was deserved or not, the discredit of Hobbes’s geometry was very 
great among professional mathematicians. It is true that his interest in geometry 
arised from its method much more than from its content («delectatus» non «ob 
theoremata», but «ob artem ratiocinandi»
45); but it is precisely also from a 
methodological point of view that Hobbes’s geometry is problematic, though 
geometry should offer the methodological paradigm of science.  
We have already considered the double operation involved in the process of 
science, and in a paradigmatic form in geometry: the former is the conception (or 
construction) of kinetic generations (concepta generatio); the latter is the deduction 
from propositions formulated in terms signifying these generations. Hobbes 
reasserts this in chapt. XX: 
 
And seeing also, that the end of the Analysticks, is either the construction of such a Probleme 
as it is possible, or the detection of the impossibility thereof; whensoever the Probleme may be 
solved, the Analyst must not stay, till he come to those things which contain the efficient cause of 
that whereof he is to make construction. But he must of necessity stay when he comes to prime 
Propositions; and these are Definitions. These Definitions therefore must contain the efficient 
cause of his Construction; I say of his Construction, not of the Conclusion which he 
demonstrates, for the cause of the Conclusion is contained in the premised proposition; that is to 
say, the truth of the proposition he proves, is drawn from the propositions which prove the 
same. But the cause of his construction is in the thing themselves, and consists in motion, or in 
the concourse of motion
46.  
 
But, it seems that in reality, in spite of all his good intentions, Hobbes does not 
succeed in combining these two different processes of reasoning (that is the 
construction or kinetic generation and the deduction) in the orderly and clear way 
he claims, and he is very far from giving such a form to geometry as should belong 
to it by nature. Confronted with the science that he assumed as a paradigm, his 
method seems to find an application extremely laborious and perhaps impossible.  
Why? On the one hand, in retrospect, we could answer that his conception of 
the a priori nature of geometric accidents – outcomes of our constructions – would 
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demand more complex mediations before being operatively applied to solve 
problems; on the other hand it is evident the backwardness of his concepts of 
measure (that is determination of equality and inequality) and of equation. As for 
the former concept (concerning lengths or areas to be compared) he resorts to 
heterogeneous calculations (of motions, through «indivisibles» or «powers»). And 
he, in the end, affirms: «But if the question be much complicated, there cannot by 
any of these wayes be constituted a cartaine Rule, … but the successe will depend 
upon dexterity, upon formerly acquired science, and many times upon fortune»
47. 
Sure he reaffirms that «the true teaching of Geometry is by Syntesis, according to 
Euclides method»
48; but it seems to be a confirmation merely in principle.   
As for the backwardness of the latter concept (equation), this has to do with the 
refusal (or underestimate) of algebra. This derives from the strict nominalism of 
Hobbes, that is from the fact that symbols (and algebra is, according to him, 
«symbolic») are not – and cannot be – real «names». That is to say: since they lack 
in that correspondence to real ideas (i.e. ideas actually present in the mind, or in the 
imagination) in which the «evidence» consists (and «evidence» is the first requisite 
of knowledge). The «evidence», he says in The Elements, is «the concomitance of a 
man’s conception with the word’s that signify such conception»
49. In the following 
works the concept of evidence seems to be absorbed in that of «truth» (of an idea), 
very probably in order to avoid that a distinction between «evidence» and «truth» 
could induce readers to believe that a knowledge could be true (in the sense of 
syntactically true) without being evident
50. In fact Hobbes affirms that only the 
names can be used which «signify» ideas really present in the mind; therefore he 
never was the theorist of the science as a merely linguistical or syntactical 
construction. By contrast, he claims a perfect one-to-one correspondence between 
«names» and «ideas» (it is obvious that by «name» he does not mean a singular term, 
or voice, but any combination of words corresponding to a certain idea).  
The real existence of the idea is what grants comprehension (understanding), 
without which there cannot be that process which is called reasoning and 
demonstration. 
Therefore, faithful to these assumptions, he cannot but deny the nature of true 
science to algebra, whose «symbols» he continues to understand as those made use 
of by the scholastic logic.  
Even on this point the divergence from Descartes cannot be greater. 
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